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NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF KOONTZ 
DANIEL P. SELMI∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE EXACTIONS REFORM PROJECT 
A majority of the Supreme Court has been engaged in a long-running 
project intended to reform the use of exactions in land use permitting.  The 
Court’s seminal decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission1 and 
Dolan v. City of Tigard2 reshaped the law under which public agencies can 
require dedications of real property as conditions of approving land use 
proposals.  Like them or not, the decisions provided a more definite doctri-
nal framework for exactions of land. 
The Court’s 2013 decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Man-
agement District,3 however, falls into a different category.  The decision 
went beyond Nollan and Dolan, inserting Takings Clause issues directly in 
the pre-decision negotiation process.  The Court held that demands seeking 
to impose excessive conditions on land use projects could violate the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions.4  The decision has led to an outpouring 
of largely critical academic commentary.5 
Deterring “extortion[],” “coercion,” “evasi[on],” and use of “leverage” 
by local governments plainly motivated the Court’s decision.6  The Court’s 
five-Justice majority believes that land use agencies are acting improperly 
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 1.  483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (an “essential nexus” must exist between a condition placed on 
a project and an end that would have justified the denial of the project). 
 2.  512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring dedication of land to be roughly proportional to the 
impact of a proposed development). 
 3.  133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 4.  Id. at 2595 (“The principles that undergird our decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not 
change depending on whether the government approves a permit on the condition that the appli-
cant turn over property or denies a permit because the applicant refuses to do so.”).  
 5.  See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014) (arguing that the Koontz Court failed to justify the expansion of tak-
ings law in light of the practical harms that will result); Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287 (2013) (arguing that the Court should ground its height-
ened scrutiny of land use in the Due Process Clause, rather than the Takings Clause, given the dif-
ficulty in developing coherent, administrable, and appealing exactions jurisprudence); Mark Fen-
ster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings 
Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403 (2014) (suggesting that Koontz may not in fact signal a new di-
rection in takings law, but rather, solidifies the Court’s exactions jurisprudence as an exception to 
the Penn Central test for regulatory takings).  
 6.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594–95. 
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and that judicial intervention is needed in the pre-decision stage of the regu-
latory process to reform their practices.7  The Court employed the extension 
of the takings doctrine in Koontz as a vehicle for this reform effort. 
The question, then, is what effect Koontz will have on local govern-
ments’ regulatory behavior and, in particular, on negotiations between local 
governments and developers.8  As with the other Supreme Court takings 
decisions,9 Koontz triggered a flurry of predictions about its effect.  First in 
line was Justice Elena Kagan, whose dissent suggested that local govern-
ments might stop communicating with project applicants to avoid potential 
takings claims.10  Professor Sean Nolon surveyed various potential respons-
es, such as the possibility that municipalities may favor denying projects ra-
ther than negotiating with applicants.11  Other articles suggested that in the 
future only developers (rather than municipalities) might make offers of ex-
actions in negotiations,12 that the size of the municipality will determine 
                                                          
 7.  The Court’s concern over governmental impropriety is evident from its choice of lan-
guage repeatedly characterizing government violations of its constitutional standards as “extor-
tion.”  See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“In short, unless the permit 
condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction 
is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting J.E.D. As-
socs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 1–15 (N.H. 1981))); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
387 (1994) (same).  The opinion in Koontz begins by declaring that Nollan and Dolan “provide 
important protection against the misuse of the power of land-use regulation.” 133 S. Ct. at 2591.  
It later notes the “special vulnerability of land use permit applicants to extortionate demands for 
money.”  Id. at 2603.  See generally Daniel P. Selmi, Takings and Extortion, FLA. L. REV. (2016) 
(forthcoming) (discussing how the Court has used the concept of extortion in its exactions cases 
and the implications of this use). 
 8.  The Supreme Court’s takings decisions apply to states and regional agencies, as well as 
to local governments.  For convenience, in this Essay the discussion refers to “municipalities” and 
“local governments” but is intended to cover the wider group of governmental entities.  
 9.  Indeed, suggesting alarming consequences is somewhat of a cottage industry with respect 
to the Court’s takings decisions.  See, e.g., The Constitution’s New Public Burden, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 28, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/28/opinion/the-constitution-s-new-public-
burden.html (terming the Dolan decision a “triumph of ideology over community needs to protect 
fragile environments and scarce resources”). 
 10.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If a local government risked a lawsuit 
every time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would 
cease to do so; indeed, the government might desist altogether from communicating with appli-
cants.”). 
 11.  Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court In-
vaded Local Government, 67 FLA. L. REV. 171, 203 (2015) (“Will it cause municipalities to favor 
the absolutism of denials over the flexibility of deliberative negotiation?”). 
 12.  E.g., Peter A. Clodfelter & Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Through the 
Just Compensation Clause: Understanding Koontz’s “Special Application” of the Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Conditions by Tracing the Doctrine’s History, 46 URB. LAW. 569, 621 (2014) 
(“Perhaps the haziness of determining exactly when a good-faith negotiation turns into extortion 
will cause the city and developer’s roles to switch and the developer will propose exactions to the 
local government.”). 
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whether it continues proposing exactions after Koontz,13 and that municipal-
ities could issue more unconditioned permits.14 
This Essay takes a different tack from many responses to Koontz, argu-
ing that the actual impact of the decision is likely to be relatively small, for 
several reasons.  First, it suggests that the complexity and diversity of the 
local land use process defeats the kind of uniformly broad prophylactic ef-
fect that the Court seeks.  Second, the Essay contends that as agency discre-
tion increases, it will be less likely that the agency’s negotiations with a de-
veloper will result in a Koontz problem.  Third, it argues that, to the extent 
municipalities and project applicants enter into development agreements, 
Koontz becomes irrelevant.  Finally, the Essay points to the use of state leg-
islation as a more effective instrument for addressing excessive government 
exactions. 
II.  COMPLEXITY, DISCRETION, AND CONTRACT 
A.  The Multiple Variables in the Land Use World 
Supreme Court decisions under the Takings Clause bind all state agen-
cies that regulate land use.15  Because of this sweeping effect, there is a ten-
dency to assume that those rulings impact all land use decisionmakers 
equally.  Reinforcing this tendency is the basic structure for local land use 
regulation, which is similar nationwide despite the absence of any overarch-
ing federal law dictating uniformity.16 
                                                          
 13.  Christopher Serkin, The Winners and Losers in Negotiating Exactions: A Response to 
Sean Nolon, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 9, 11 (2015) (“All else being equal, smaller governments will 
therefore be less likely than cities to engage in negotiations that might trigger litigation.”).  Profes-
sor Serkin then suggests that “all else is not equal” and that “cities will generally have greater ca-
pacity to negotiate through intermediaries and to generally avoid the Koontz pitfalls.”  Id. 
 14.  Timothy M. Mulvaney, On Bargaining for Development, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 66 (2015).  
In addition to issuing more unconditioned permits, Professor Mulvaney suggests that public agen-
cies might (1) strategically propose, alongside other conditions, a constitutionally acceptable con-
dition that is unpalatable to the applicant; (2) fashion land use restrictions as use limitations rather 
than exactions; (3) assert that conditions deemed illegal under the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine cannot be construed as legal acts that take property for a public use; or (4) renew an unquali-
fied challenge to Nollan and Dolan.  Id.; see also Mark Fenster, Regulating in the Post-Koontz 
World, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 26, 28 (2015) (“[R]egulatory entities would voluntarily turn to regula-
tory formulas as a means to impose conditions rather than rely upon bespoke conditions that face 
higher judicial scrutiny . . . .” (citing Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: 
Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 689 (2004))); cf. Shelley Ross Saxer, 
To Bargain or Not to Bargain? A Response to Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz, 67 FLA. 
L. REV. F. 5, 8 (2015) (concluding that “the consequences of this decision are not as dire as pre-
dicted by Nolon and others”). 
 15.  See, e.g., Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Cano Martin Pena v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 12 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (“The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states and to Puerto Rico 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 16.  The uniformity is due to the widespread adoption by states of the model Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act.  NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, 1 AMERICAN LAND 
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But within this structure, land use regulation on the ground is quite 
complex,17 and that complexity is easily underappreciated.  The variables in 
the system are numerous.  Single-purpose agencies wield permit power over 
quite narrow subject areas, while multi-purpose agencies address a much 
wider variety of land use concerns.  Some public agencies exercise land use 
authority over small geographic areas; others have authority over large are-
as.  Some affected areas are urban; others are rural.  Moreover, the sophisti-
cation of the legal advice given to public agencies about the Supreme 
Court’s takings doctrine can differ substantially. 
Another variable is the size of development proposals.  Some pro-
posals require only one permit, while multi-year developments will require 
interlocking, sequential permits.18  Appointed officials make some land use 
decisions; politically elected officials make others.19  And there is a final 
important point: land developers are first and foremost business persons.  
They concentrate with laser-like focus on ensuring the financial success of 
their project, not on vindicating their Fifth Amendment rights. 
Thus, while Koontz will govern in all jurisdictions, it will be applied in 
a wide variety of situations.  In many cases the issues raised by Koontz will 
be far down the parties’ lists of important concerns; their attention will be 
focused elsewhere.  For example, the developer may be more concerned 
with securing a larger number of units in the project to increase the profit 
margin, while a municipality might focus on addressing the traffic flow 
from the project.  Consequently, while the Supreme Court’s purpose in 
Koontz was generally to deter local government overreaching, its actual ef-
fect will vary widely in this complex regulatory world.  The variables of the 
land use regulatory process will defeat a uniform response to the decision. 
B.  The Spectrum of Discretion and Bargaining 
Perhaps the most important variable affecting exaction decisions is the 
breadth of discretion exercised by the decisionmaking agency.  It may help 
to visualize agency levels of discretion as a spectrum.  Located on the left 
                                                          
PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 18.01 (1988) (noting that the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act was adopted at one point in all fifty states and is still in effect (with 
various modifications) in forty-seven states, and also noting the “remarkable phenomenon” that 
“all the states should have essentially the same enabling legislation”). 
 17.  See Fenster, supra note 14, at 27 (“The complexity of land use practice on the ground 
reflects not only the topographical variability of the nation, but also its economic, ideological, and 
institutional variability . . . .”).  
 18.  See, e.g., CK Dev., LLC v. Town of Nolensville, No. M2010-00633-COA-R3-CV, 2012 
WL 38287, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2012) (phase 7 of multi-phase development). 
 19.  City councils, for example, are elected officials.  City Councils, NAT’L LEAGUE OF 
CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-officials/city-
councils (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).  By contrast, planning commissioners are appointed.  Commis-
sion Profiles, AM. PLANNING ASSOC., http://www.planning.org/commissioners/profiles/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2016).  
SelmiFinalBookProof 
2016] NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF KOONTZ 747 
of the spectrum are single-purpose agencies focused principally on one is-
sue, perhaps wetlands or historic preservation.  Their discretion will be nar-
row, and their negotiations tightly focused.  As the spectrum proceeds to the 
right, the issues of concern to the public agencies broaden as does, concom-
itantly, the discretion that they exercise.  These agencies will possess au-
thority to address a variety of impacts from projects, and many of those re-
sponses will be subject to the constitutional constraints of Nollan, Dolan, 
and Koontz. 
Finally, on the far right of the spectrum, local governments exercise 
very broad discretion.  Here the projects are quite large and, perhaps, multi-
staged.  The local government possesses wide discretion in the design of the 
project, the scope of its infrastructure, and the sequence in which it is actu-
ally constructed. 
As the amount of discretion on this spectrum widens, the impulse of 
the public agency and developer to bargain rises.  Single-purpose agencies 
are narrowly focused; they impose conditions designed to achieve a specific 
goal.20  While they might wish to bargain over those conditions, the scope 
of agency discretion means that any bargaining will occur within limited 
confines.  Further, the agencies have little leverage over the developer in the 
bargaining process other than project approval.  At the same time, however, 
their focus on a single goal could lead to overreaching as they concentrate 
narrowly on imposing conditions designed to achieve that one goal.  These 
factors might well explain why, out of the Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz trilo-
gy of exaction decisions, two involve narrow-purpose agencies: the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission21 and the St. Johns River Water Management 
District.22 
The Koontz decision is likely to have some effect on such narrow-
purpose agencies.  The limited scope of discretion exercised by these agen-
cies can easily make bargaining positions appear to be demands.  Indeed, 
that is precisely what happened in Koontz.  The Supreme Court accepted the 
Florida Court of Appeal’s characterization of the Water Management Dis-
                                                          
 20.  Orlando E. Delogu et al., Some Model Amendments to Maine (and Other States’) Land 
Use Control Legislation, 56 ME. L. REV. 323, 363 n.6 (2004) (noting “the proliferation in recent 
decades of states’ adoption, in piecemeal fashion, of a range of single-purpose state land use con-
trol measures, including power plant siting, wetlands preservation, coastal zone protection, and 
wild rivers preservation, among many others”). 
 21.  See CAL. COASTAL COMM,N, http://www.coastal.ca.gov/whoweare.html (last visited Oct. 
2, 2015) (“The mission of the Coastal Commission is to protect, conserve, restore, and enhance 
environmental and human-based resources of the California coast and ocean for environmentally 
sustainable and prudent use by current and future generations.”). 
 22.  See ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DISTRICT, http://floridaswater.com/overview.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (stating agency’s mission is to “ensur[e] the sustainable use of Flori-
da’s water for the benefit of the people of the District and the state”). 
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trict’s negotiation as a demand even though the District took pains to state 
that it would consider other offers.23 
Agencies with a variety of concerns and wider discretion will respond 
differently.  An example might be a city considering a large subdivision.  
The city is unlikely to turn down the project because of a single impact.  
The city also will generally recognize the need for new housing and will 
wish to maximize the benefits that it will receive from the project.  None of 
those benefits will accrue if the project is denied.  On the other side of the 
permit process, the developer is largely concerned with minimizing costs 
across the various exactions that will address the project’s impacts.  At the 
same time, she would prefer a set of exaction conditions that maximize the 
development’s benefits and thus add as much value to the development as 
possible. 
The stage is thus set for some degree of bargaining between the par-
ties.  The decisions in Nollan and Dolan will constrain that bargaining, as 
the agency cannot approve a project that violates the “essential nexus”24  
and “rough proportionality”25 tests.  Moreover, the agency will now be sub-
ject to Koontz’s new constraint under which bargaining positions can be 
viewed as demands that would violate the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions.  Still, the wider scope of discretion leaves more room for the “give 
and take” of bargaining. 
The negotiation pattern is thus likely to be more complex, featuring in-
terconnected issues and multiple exchanges of viewpoints.  The pattern will 
probably vary substantially from the much more straightforward negotia-
tions in Koontz.  As long as the negotiations proceed on a normal track, the 
parties are likely to reach an agreement.  And if they do not, the odds are 
that the bargaining record will not contain the type of unequivocal, unilat-
eral demand that would support a Koontz claim.  Furthermore, municipali-
ties can take affirmative steps to minimize the potential that negotiation po-
                                                          
 23.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 (2013) (declining 
“to reach respondent’s argument that its demands for property were too indefinite to give rise to 
liability under Nollan and Dolan,” and noting that the Florida Supreme Court “relied instead on 
the Florida District Court of Appeals’ characterization of respondent’s behavior as a demand for 
Nollan/Dolan purposes”). 
 24.  See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (referring to the re-
quirement that a condition further the end that would justify prohibiting a project as an “essential 
nexus”). 
 25.  See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“We think a term such as ‘rough 
proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment.  
No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individual-
ized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development.”). 
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sitions look like demands.  For example, they can structure positions to 
avoid language that makes them appear to be demands.26 
In sum, two factors will tend to minimize the importance of Koontz.  
First, as the discretion available to an agency increases, the bargaining pro-
cess is likely to focus on a wider variety of issues than just the narrow de-
mands at issue in Koontz.  Second, the negotiation process itself is likely to 
be more comprehensive and correspondingly less likely to result in the kind 
of explicit demands that the Court assumed were made in Koontz.  Overall, 
the complexity of the land use process works against producing situations 
like the one in Koontz. 
C.  Contractual Agreements 
As a project gets even bigger, with its implementation perhaps occur-
ring in phases and extending over a number of years, the agency’s discre-
tion grows much larger.  As a result, the government and the developer may 
well decide that negotiating a development agreement would best address 
their mutual concerns.27  In doing so, both negotiating parties will see the 
Supreme Court’s exaction cases, including Koontz, as irrelevant. 
The situations faced by the government and developer lead to that out-
come.  The limitations imposed by Koontz and its antecedents, Nollan and 
Dolan, favor developer interests, and all things being equal, developers 
would insist on honoring those constraints.  But here other concerns inter-
vene.  The developer’s primary focus is securing certainty; she has a large 
project with many facets that will build out over time.  The developer may 
be concerned that a changing economy might make immediate construction 
unwise at present and so wish to ensure that the rights to build the project 
remain in effect for a longer period of time.28 
                                                          
 26.  Selmi, supra note 7 (noting that municipalities can “take pains to structure the positions 
that they take in bargaining to prevent their use later in litigation”).   
 27.  See James S. Burling, The 2013 Takings Triplets: From Exactions to Flooding to Raisin 
Seizures—Implications for Litigators, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RIGHTS CONF. J. 163, 179 n.69 
(2014) (“Development agreements have become a very common land use approval vehicle since 
Nollan.” (citing David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development 
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nol-
lan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 (2001), then citing John J. Delaney, Development 
Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to “Let's Make a Deal!”, 25 URB LAW. 49 (1993), and 
then citing Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in Califor-
nia and Other States, 22 STETSON L. REV. 761 (1993))). 
 28.  See Howard Hughes Co., LLC v. Comm’r. Internal Revenue, No. 10539-11, 2014 WL 
10077466, at *4 (U.S.T.C. June 2, 2014) (“Petitioners were parties to master development agree-
ments with Las Vegas, Nevada, and Clark County, Nevada, that govern the planned development 
of Summerlin West and Summerlin South, respectively.  These long-term, 30-year agreements 
assure petitioners that they will be able to develop the land in accordance with the agreements and 
remove any necessity to negotiate development agreements and entitlements village by village.”). 
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Accordingly, in situations such as these the developer would like to 
obtain an agreement locking in the project for an extended period.  While a 
state statute on vested rights29 may confer a measure of protection for the 
entitlements over some time, that time period might not be enough.  Fur-
thermore, the developer is concerned that if the entitlements expire and she 
needs to return to the jurisdiction for a new approval, the political circum-
stances could have changed drastically.  A potential nightmare for a devel-
oper is a city council whose composition changed and whose newly elected 
members attempt to alter the project during its development.30 
The municipality, in contrast, is concerned about comprehensively ad-
dressing the impacts from the developer’s large project.  It sees the “essen-
tial nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests as barriers to attaining full mit-
igation of the project’s impacts and to meeting the city’s larger 
infrastructure needs.  The municipality also views itself as entitled to some 
“quid pro quo” for the consideration that it is giving up in the contract, such 
as, for example, its agreement to “lock in” the development for a longer pe-
riod. 
Under these circumstances, both parties are highly attracted to a con-
tract solution.  They will see contract, with its focus on mutually beneficial 
provisions, as a better vehicle for reaching their goals than remaining solely 
within the public regulatory framework.  And here, Koontz becomes irrele-
vant for several reasons. 
First, the parties are negotiating a contract; they are not engaged in a 
regulatory proceeding initiated by an application for a land use approval.  
Any demands made by the municipality will not lead to a permit denial, as 
in Koontz.  Instead, in the event of an impasse, the negotiations for the con-
tract will simply stop. 
Second, even if an argument could be fashioned that Koontz somehow 
applied to demands made in such negotiations, the interactions between the 
parties are different than in the normal land use process.  Here, the parties 
really are negotiating rather than making demands—their purpose is to 
reach a meeting of the minds.  The comprehensive nature of the negotia-
tions over the development agreement would make it difficult to show that, 
                                                          
 29.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-385.1 (2007) (“A vested right shall be deemed established with 
respect to any property upon the valid approval, or conditional approval, of a site specific devel-
opment plan or a phased development plan, following notice and public hearing by the city with 
jurisdiction over the property.  Such vested right shall confer upon the landowner the right to un-
dertake and complete the development and use of said property under the terms and conditions of 
the site specific development plan or the phased development plan including any amendments 
thereto.”). 
 30.  Perhaps the classic case on this point is Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast 
Regional Commission, 553 P.2d 546, 557 (Cal. 1976) (finding that multi-stage development pro-
ject for which infrastructure had been installed did not have a vested right to development and 
thus was subject to the new California Coastal Zone Conservation Act).  
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at any given point, a public agency had formulated a specific demand that 
would constitute a taking. 
Third, if a contract proves impossible to negotiate, the developer may 
fall back on seeking the “normal” land use approvals without the benefit of 
the development agreement.  Suing the agency at this point would not help 
achieve those approvals. 
Last, and perhaps most importantly, parties to such negotiations do not 
believe that the regulatory restrictions found in the permit process apply to 
development agreements.  The parties will assume that their entire agree-
ment resides in the contract’s terms; they do not see Nollan, Dolan, and 
Koontz as applying to contract.  Moreover, if an agreement is reached, the 
developer’s focus will be on implementing the agreement, not on vindicat-
ing any perceived constitutional deficiency in the balance of exactions ne-
gotiated in the contract.  In short, the Supreme Court’s attempt in Koontz to 
deter local government “extortion” will be largely ineffectual under these 
circumstances. 
III.  ADDRESSING MUNICIPAL OVERREACHING AFTER KOONTZ 
A.  The Effectiveness of Koontz in Perspective 
The Koontz decision is explainable only by the Court’s concern over 
municipal overreaching in imposing exactions.  This concern led the ma-
jority to decide the case even though it was not certain that the public agen-
cy had ever made a specific demand that formed the basis for its denial of 
the project,31 and even though the existence of any remedy was highly un-
certain.32  Moreover, although the Takings Clause by its terms concerns 
compensation for property taken, the Court applied the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine to a situation where it recognized that no actual taking 
had occurred.33 
So what will Koontz accomplish?  The discussion above leads to the 
conclusion that it will not be highly effective for several reasons.  First, the 
widely varied nature of land use proposals and the interactions between 
municipalities and developers mean that the concerns over Koontz are likely 
to play a subordinate role.  Second, as the municipality’s discretion grows, 
                                                          
 31.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 (2013) (“we decline 
to reach respondent’s argument that its demands for property were too indefinite to give rise to 
liability under Nollan and Dolan”). 
 32.  Id. at 2597 (“Because petitioner brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of action, 
the Court has no occasion to discuss what remedies might be available for a Nollan/Dolan uncon-
stitutional conditions violation either here or in other cases.”). 
 33.  Michael T. Kamprath, A Look at Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 
45 URB. LAW. 953, 969–70 (2013) (“The Koontz case is remarkable because the Court majority 
holds that monetary exactions can form the basis for a Nollan/Dolan claim even after finding that 
nothing was, in fact, taken.”). 
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the negotiations grow increasingly complex, and demands of the type the 
Court assumed in Koontz are less likely.  Third, a significant subset of de-
velopment proposals will result in development agreements in which the 
parties assume that the constitutional constraints of Nollan¸ Dolan, and 
Koontz do not apply. 
Indeed, the Koontz decision might even incentivize parties to negotiate 
contracts that exceed the constitutional limits imposed by Nollan and Do-
lan.  In the non-contractual situation, Koontz allows negotiating positions to 
be read as demands that constitute takings for purposes of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.34  If the parties negotiate within the land use 
regulatory framework, that outcome is always a possibility—albeit a remote 
one in many instances, as the parties’ other concerns during the negotiations 
are more likely to take precedence.  However, if a municipality is concerned 
about Koontz, it would be better off negotiating a development agreement.  
The parties believe that Koontz’s exactions limitations are irrelevant to such 
a contract,35 and their energy can thus be spent on the “give and take” of re-
al bargaining, not on the types of intransigent demands that could lead to 
trouble under Koontz. 
B.  Examining the Waiver Theory 
Given the growing importance of contract in land use, it is worth con-
sidering the contracting parties’ assumption about the constitutional protec-
tions established by Nollan and Dolan.  Are they correct in assuming that 
these limits are irrelevant in the context of land use contracts?  Can consti-
tutional constraints imposed on local governments be avoided so easily? 
The conclusion that the exactions limitations do not apply to contract 
rests on the theory that a developer voluntarily waives those limitations by 
entering into the contract.36  The waiver theory has not been tested in court 
or fully explored in the literature on development agreements.  The near 
universal opinion, however, has been that developers waive constitutional 
                                                          
 34.  See supra note 4. 
 35.  See infra Part III.B. 
 36.  See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Condi-
tions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and 
Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 692 (2001) (“The question is whether the local government 
may go further since the development or annexation agreement is indeed a voluntary agreement 
which neither government nor landowner is compelled to either negotiate or execute.  So long as 
the agreement is indeed voluntary, the answer is almost certainly yes.”); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., & 
Sanford M. Skaggs, Legal Issues and Considerations, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: 
PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS 121, 130–31 (Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L. Marsh eds., 
1989) (“On occasion, city officials will attempt to obtain greater exactions by suggesting or de-
claring that they will refuse to negotiate an agreement if the developer does not comply, on the 
basis that a city need not enter into one in the first place.”).  
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protections by contractually agreeing to exactions that would not comply 
with Nollan and Dolan.37 
Two principal arguments support the constitutional waiver theory.  
First, the idea of waiver here relates logically to other waivers of constitu-
tional rights.38  For example, the courts have long held that parties can 
waive their constitutional protections in criminal cases, and those waivers 
have expanded in recent years.39  As long as parties understand their rights 
and freely release them, a wide variety of waivers are possible in criminal 
cases.  Courts then treat issues that arise under the waivers as questions of 
contractual interpretation, not as matters of constitutional law.40  Indeed, the 
prevalence of the waiver theory in recent decades not only testifies to its at-
tractiveness, it may also indicate a sort of inevitable expansion of the use of 
contract in other areas, like land use, nominally governed by public law.  
We are, in short, increasingly comfortable with the idea of replacing public 
law with contract. 
Second, at least some of the concerns over waiver in other areas of law 
are not present in the land use field.  There is, for example, no real concern 
about developers understanding the rights that they are waiving.41  Given 
the size and scope of the land use projects that now are the subject of devel-
opment agreements, developers are almost certainly cognizant of their 
rights. 
Still, the waiver theory has some troubling aspects.  To begin with, 
while one can certainly debate whether Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz establish 
the proper boundaries to prevent overreaching, few individuals reject the 
premise that land use agencies can overreach in demanding exactions.  
Some boundaries are needed.  The use of contract, however, simply makes 
                                                          
 37.  Interestingly, a large number of development agreements contain no express waiver of 
constitutional protections.  The waiver is simply assumed. 
 38.  Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Con-
tract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 917 (2006) (“Some of the resistance to connecting con-
stitutional rights to contract law is that we are accustomed to thinking of these rights as inaliena-
ble, if not sacred.  But numerous contexts exist in which constitutional rights are surrendered with 
some government benefit serving as the consideration.”). 
 39.  Id. (“[S]ome constitutional rights (especially those relating to criminal procedure) are, in 
practice, used almost entirely as bargaining chips; rarely are they retained and actually exercised 
by the holder of those rights.”); Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An 
Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74 (2015) (“Criminal matters 
are often resolved by plea rather than trial, and procedural protections are routinely waived as part 
of the bargain.  Contract principles, rather than constitutional law, govern these agreements.”). 
 40.  See, e.g., United States v. Obey, 790 F.3d 545, 547 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We apply contract 
law principles when we construe a plea agreement.  Thus, ‘each party should receive the benefit of 
its bargain’ under the agreement.” (quoting United States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 
2009))). 
 41.  McCamey v. Epps, 658 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he test for a valid waiver is a 
case-specific inquiry into ‘all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.’” (quoting Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970))). 
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those boundaries largely irrelevant.  The constitutional constraints may es-
tablish a starting point for negotiations (or they may not), but nothing more. 
Additionally, the Court has grounded its takings limitations in the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions.  This doctrine holds that the govern-
ment cannot condition certain benefits upon the waiver of constitutional 
rights.42  Development agreements, however, allow the local governments 
to do exactly what this doctrine prohibits, to accomplish indirectly what 
they could not do directly.43  The agreements in effect authorize the gov-
ernment to place conditions on development that would be unconstitutional 
if imposed through the public regulatory process.  This sort of circumven-
tion should give pause, for the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is in-
tended to prevent just this situation—the waiver of constitutional rights to 
secure a benefit from the government. 
Furthermore, the set of exactions agreed to in such contracts substan-
tially depends on negotiating power.44  Where governments possess signifi-
cant bargaining power in the negotiations, they are likely to receive exac-
tions far exceeding the constitutional limitations.  This set of exactions will 
be greater than those secured by a local government with less bargaining 
power.  In other words, the more bargaining power that the local govern-
ment has, the more likely it is to actually overreach in negotiating the con-
tract.  Contract law thus rewards the very same overreaching that constitu-
tional law seeks to deter and that animated the Koontz decision. 
Finally, the bargaining outcome will not necessarily bear any logical 
relationship to the environmental or infrastructure effects that the project 
will cause.  Instead, the outcome is more random, resulting from the factors 
that affect the flow of negotiations rather than from a rational planning 
analysis. 
In short, the widespread use of development agreements assumes that 
they render superfluous Nollan and Dolan, and now Koontz as well.  That 
outcome may be correct under contract law, but there are important ques-
tions about allowing contract law to so easily override the Fifth Amend-
ment’s constitutional protections. 
                                                          
 42.  Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 473–74 (1991) (noting the doctrine’s re-
quirement that “even if the government is not constitutionally required to grant a particular privi-
lege or benefit, once it offers that benefit, it may not condition the offer upon the recipient’s 
surrender or waiver of a constitutional right”). 
 43.  Indeed, in Koontz the Court was concerned with similar tactics.  It sought to prevent local 
governments from “evad[ing] the Nollan/Dolan limitations simply by phrasing its demands for 
property as conditions precedent to permit approval.”  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. 
Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2589 (2013). 
 44.  See Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 591, 629 (“[V]ariables in the bargaining process render it likely that negotiated outcomes 
will differ on otherwise similar developments.”). 
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C.  The Alternative of State Legislation 
The discussion above argues that the Supreme Court’s attempt to po-
lice land use negotiations in Koontz will have limited effect.  Given the 
concern over local government overreaching in dealing with developers, are 
there any other potential checks on overreaching?  The obvious check, of 
course, is state legislation. 
Implicit in the Supreme Court’s decisions is the premise that the 
Court’s supervision is necessary to avoid unfair exactions imposed by mu-
nicipalities.45  But if municipal extortion was rampant, there is every reason 
to expect that state legislatures would respond to curb municipal discretion.  
Property developers are not a powerless group; they have the political influ-
ence to make their views known.46  The absence of a large-scale state legis-
lative response to municipal overreaching certainly raises questions about 
whether that overreaching is anywhere near as unfair or epidemic as the 
Court’s language in Koontz assumes.47 
Development agreements, however, raise different considerations with 
respect to state legislation.  Both developers and municipalities see efficien-
cy benefits in negotiating development agreements; thus, any push for state 
legislation that would address either municipal overreaching or the dispar-
ate outcomes in development agreements would be very unlikely.  To date, 
the state legislation on development agreements confirms this conclusion.  
That legislation is largely procedural and quite general in nature.  After au-
thorizing such agreements, the laws address issues such as the length of de-
velopment agreements and the process by which they might be adopted.48  
But they largely do not constrain local government discretion in seeking 
benefits over and above those allowable under Nollan and Dolan. 
One case, however, suggests that at least under certain circumstances, 
those statutes might limit a municipality’s bargaining discretion in a devel-
opment agreement.  In Toll Bros., Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of 
the County of Burlington,49 a local jurisdiction insisted that a developer 
                                                          
 45.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591 (“Our decisions in Nollan . . . and Dolan . . . provide im-
portant protection against the misuse of the power of land-use regulation.”). 
 46.  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2003) (“As repeat players in the political process without significant coordination costs, 
developers generally have a leg up in the political arena.”); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Di-
mension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 260 (2004) (“The enactment of 
property rights legislation, together with the imposition of statutory limits on development mora-
toria, suggest that the political power developers enjoy in state legislatures provides them with 
significant protection against potentially abusive practices by local governments. . . .  Landowners 
will not always win in the state legislatures, but their interests will not be ignored.”). 
 47.  Selmi, supra note 7.  
 48.  See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 94.513(2) (West 2015) (“Approval of a development agree-
ment requires compliance with local regulations and the approval of the city or county governing 
body after notice and hearing.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §9-500.05 (West 2014).   
 49.  944 A.2d 1 (N.J. 2008).  
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meet its obligations under a negotiated contract.  These obligations required 
the developer to pay far more than a pro rata share of improvements even 
though the circumstances of the development had markedly changed since 
the contract was signed.  The agreement, insisted the county, was a binding 
contract: a deal is a deal.50 
Plainly bothered by the county’s position, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court disagreed.  It found that a development agreement is not an “inde-
pendent contractual source of obligation.”51  If it was, the court explained, 
“the effect would be to approve public entities and developers entering into 
‘voluntary’ agreements in violation of the specific provisions of the MLUL 
[Municipal Land Use Law].”52  In short, the court simply found that the 
agreement was not a binding instrument because the agency had no authori-
ty to negotiate conditions that exceeded the boundaries of state law. 
If applied in other jurisdictions, such a holding would bring to light the 
underlying issue of whether state law authorizes parties to waive constitu-
tional rights through the use of contract.  To date, that issue has largely 
been ignored.  It also might stimulate state legislatures—the institutions 
best situated to balance concerns about government overreaching with the 
benefits that accrue through development agreements—to directly address 
this issue of whether state law ought to authorize such waivers and, if so, 
what limits should be placed on them. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz fails in several ways.  First, it 
is doctrinally questionable, as others have shown.53  It is also based on an 
unsustainable premise:54 that governmental agencies uniformly engage in 
“extortion” when imposing exactions.55  But Koontz also fails on an instru-
mental basis in effecting the systematic reform that the majority sought.  
The complexity of land use factors and the variable nature of negotiations in 
light of municipal discretion mean that Koontz will not play a large role in 
negotiations over development approvals. 
                                                          
 50.  Id. at 9–10. 
 51.  Id. at 16.  
 52.  Id. at 17. 
 53.  See supra note 5. 
 54.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“No one has presented evidence that in the many States declining to apply heightened 
scrutiny to permitting fees, local officials routinely short-circuit Nollan and Dolan to extort the 
surrender of real property interests having no relation to a development’s costs.” (citing Krupp v. 
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d, at 697, then citing Home Builders Assn. of Central Arizo-
na v. Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 486, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (1997), and then citing McCarthy v. 
Leawood, 257 Kan. 566, 579, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (1995))). 
 55.  See Selmi, supra note 7. 
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Moreover, it will have no effect on an important set of land use tools: 
contracts negotiated between local governments and developers.  Under 
those contracts, exactions can exceed the limits of Nollan and Dolan, and 
now Koontz.  And the exceedances will vary from contract to contract, de-
pending on the bargaining power of the parties.  The contracting parties—
both municipalities and developers—anticipate and accept just such a re-
sult. 
Consequently, despite the Court’s intent, the constitutional limitations 
of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz apply unevenly to current land use regulation.  
Effective regulation of potential municipal overreaching will have to origi-
nate elsewhere, such as in state legislation. 
